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Comment
ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of
Education: The Black Sheep of Graduation
Prayer Cases
Ann E. Stockman*
The Black Horse school district routinely allowed prayer at
senior high school graduation ceremonies' until a 1992 Supreme
Court decision cast the constitutionality of such prayers in
doubt.2 In hopes of comporting with the requirements of the
Establishment Clause, the school board adopted a new policy in
1993.3 This policy allowed prayer at graduation ceremonies
only if a majority of the students attending the ceremonies de-
cided to include such prayer by popular vote.4 In June of 1993,
the graduating class of Highland Regional High School voted to
include a prayer in its graduation ceremony.5 Shortly before
graduation, Edward Ross, a member of the senior class, sought
to enjoin the school from allowing the religious exercise, claim-
* J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1997,
Drake University.
1. The original policy of the Black Horse school district was to allow local
clergy "on a rotating basis" to give an invocation and benediction. ACLU v.
Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1474 (3d Cir. 1996).
2. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (striking down a graduation
school prayer where participation was coerced by state power).
3. The resolution, termed Policy IKFD, was the fourth version to be pro-
posed to the board and sought to remove school board involvement in the
prayer. See Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1475.
4. The senior class officers conducted the vote and the ballot included a
choice of prayer, a moment of silence, or nothing at all. See id. Additionally,
if the class elected to have a prayer, a student volunteer, rather than a clergy
or staff member, would lead the invocation. See id. The policy also gave stu-
dents control over the type of prayer to be given, and required a disclaimer on
the graduation programs explaining that the student-delivered prayer did not
represent the views of the school administration or the other students. See id.
5. Although no option received a vote by the majority of students, the
senior class officers declared prayer to be the "winner" because a plurality
voted for a version of "prayer." The class officers then selected a student vol-
unteer to deliver the prayer. See id.
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ing that the public prayer would violate his Establishment
Clause rights.6 Although the district court denied a prelimi-
nary injunction, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals granted
Ross an emergency appeal and enjoined the graduation
prayer.7 On remand, the district court permanently enjoined
prayer activities at graduation in the Black Horse district.8
The Third Circuit later upheld this decision on appeal and de-
clared that the Black Horse prayer policy violated the Estab-
lishment Clause of the United States Constitution.9
The issue in Black Horse required the court to interpret
the federal Establishment Clause, an area of jurisprudence that
has been controversial from its inception. Responding to a
1992 Supreme Court decision which prohibited state-controlled
graduation prayer, many school districts have sought to keep
prayer a part of their graduation ceremonies by allowing stu-
dent-initiated religious exercise. The Third Circuit is now the
third court of appeals to decide the issue of student-initiated
graduation prayer, with conflicting decisions resulting at both
the appellate and district court levels. With the many varying
approaches that have developed over this issue, it is likely that
the Supreme Court will revisit graduation prayer cases in the
near future.
This Comment will discuss Establishment Clause juris-
prudence in the context of the decision in Black Horse. Part I
will outline the history of the Establishment Clause and show
the increasing confusion that has arisen in this area of consti-
tutional interpretation. Part H will describe the holding in
Black Horse and detail the Third Circuit's application of the
new coercion test developed by the Supreme Court in recent
Establishment Clause cases. This Part will also provide guid-
ance for lower courts by determining which interpretation of
the coercion doctrine best comports with normative conceptions
of the Establishment Clause. Finally, this Comment will con-
clude that student-initiated prayer policies are constitutional
6. This student first requested that a member of the ACLU be allowed to
speak about safe sex at graduation but the principal told Ross that the time
constraints of the ceremony "would not permit a keynote speaker, and that
the topic requested was not generally one discussed at graduation ceremo-
nies." Id. The student also filed a complaint based on the New Jersey Consti-
tution. See id. at 1476.
7. See id. The School Board moved to vacate this injunction, but the re-
quest was denied. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 1488.
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so long as they lack state control and do not use government
power to compel the participation of students in a religious ex-
ercise.
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE EARLY YEARS: ORIGINAL PURPOSE AND INTENT
James Madison originally proposed the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment as a means to prevent the newly-formed
federal government from establishing a national religion.10
The Religion Clauses were the precursors to the modern ver-
sions of both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause. From their inception, the wording of these two consti-
tutional guarantees seemed to encompass an impossible con-
tradiction: the Free Exercise Clause appears to place an af-
firmative duty on the government to prevent any state action
that would burden religious practice, while the Establishment
Clause has been interpreted to prohibit any and all govern-
ment involvement with religion." Thus, the dictates of the Es-
10. Madison's original draft stated that "Itihe civil rights of none shall be
abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national re-
ligion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any
manner, or on any pretext, infringed." John E. Joiner, Note, A Page of History
or a Volume of Logic?: Reassessing the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 507, 509 (1996) (citing ARLIN M. ADAMS &
CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 17 (1990); ROBERT L.
CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT
FICTION 7 (1982); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 9 (1986)).
Evidence suggests that Madison proposed this amendment in response to
states' concerns that the federal government would infringe states' power to
regulate religious affairs even though such power had not been abdicated by
the states. Thus, the Religion Clauses were developed as an affimative limi-
tation on the new powers of the federal government. See Akhil Reed Amar,
Some Notes on the Establishment Clause, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 11
(1996); see also Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An
Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 311, 317 (1986) (noting that the Establishment Clause was
adopted "to address federalism concerns").
11. Evidence of this tension can be seen in two Supreme Court religion
cases. The Supreme Court has declared that states cannot withhold unem-
ployment benefits from workers who refuse to take a job which requires them
to work on their religious day, see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409
(1963), while it has also held that states must grant an exception to general
education requirements if the exception is the least restrictive way to prevent
interference with religious freedom, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236
(1972).
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tablishment Clause make the state unable to take the action
necessary to ensure the guarantees provided by the Free Exer-
cise Clause for fear that it will be seen as "establishing" a re-
ligion. Due to the inherent tension between these two clauses,
interpretation of the Establishment Clause has always been
the subject of intense debate. While some scholars argue that
the framers developed the clause in order to provide a strict
"wall of separation" between church and state,12 others claim
that the clause was only meant to prevent the establishment of
a national religion. 13 Those espousing the latter view believe
government may support religion in the abstract, as long as
particular sects are not preferred over others.14 Evidence indi-
cates that the framers most strongly supported the idea that
the Establishment Clause did not forbid all interaction be-
tween church and state because government and religion were
inexorably intertwined at the time of the proposed amend-
ment.15 Indeed, Madison and Jefferson's official actions during
12. Thomas Jefferson first developed this famous metaphor when reply-
ing by letter to the Danbury Baptist Association:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or
his worship; that the legislative powers of the government reach ac-
tions only, and not opinion,--I contemplate with sovereign reverence
that act of the whole American people which declared that their leg-
islature should "make no law respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of sepa-
ration between church and State.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting Thomas Jeffer-
son). Many members of the Supreme Court have adopted the theory that an
impenetrable wall must be erected between church and state. Justice Frank-
furter wrote, "Separation means separation, not something less. Jefferson's
metaphor in describing the relation between Church and State speaks of a
'wall of separation,' not of a fine line easily overstepped." Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring).
13. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 719,
741 (1993) (providing an overview of the competing theories).
14. Joseph Story, a prominent Establishment Clause scholar, advocates
an even stronger position by arguing that Christianity was such a "universal
sentiment" at the time of the First Amendment's inception that any move-
ment requiring a separation of church and state "would have created univer-
sal disapprobation." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES § 1874 (2d ed. 1851).
15. During the time of the amendment's ratification and for years after-
ward, religious taxes were levied in several states, the common law made
blasphemy a crime, and Sunday closing laws existed which prohibited the op-
eration of a business on the Sabbath. See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption
of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27
1808 [Vol. 83:1805
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their presidencies support this view given that they both al-
lowed the use of government funds to support religious enti-
ties. 16
The Court's first interpretations of the Establishment
Clause seemed to adopt views consistent with the framers',
suggesting that the clause simply prohibited the establishment
of a national religion. 17 In its early cases, the Court upheld a
federal grant to the Catholic church for the operation of a hos-
pital,18 allowed funds generated by Native American treaties to
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1100-07 (1995). Additionally, the federal government al-
lowed chaplains to serve the military and open congressional sessions, and
many Presidents offered "Thanksgiving proclamations." See id. at 1096 (citing
GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 97-104
(1987)). In fact, any religious symbols that still remain in official government
expression originated during this era, e.g., the use of religious references in
our pledge of allegiance, on our money, and the reference to God that precedes
all Supreme Court hearings. See Rena M. Bila, Note, The Establishment
Clause: A Constitutional Permission Slip for Religion in Public Education, 60
BROOK. L. REV. 1535, 1547-49 (1995) (noting some examples of contemporary
religious references in government activities). Explicit evidence also supports
the idea that the religion clauses were limited in scope and operated only to
prevent establishment of a national religion by the federal government.
Madison explained that the amendment was necessary not to eradicate gov-
ernment involvement with religion but rather only because he "believed that
the people feared one sect might obtain a preeminence, or two combine to-
gether, and establish a religion to which they would compel others to con-
form." Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment,
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 937 (1986) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 731 (J.
Gales ed., 1834).
16. These funds were mainly used to subsidize religious schools estab-
lished for Native Americans. See FARBER ET AL., supra note 13, at 741 (citing
ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1982)).
17. See, e.g., Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 375
(1930) (finding that appropriating state funds to purchase non-religious text-
books at sectarian schools does not violate the Establishment Clause); Arver
v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1918) (rejecting the argument that the
religious exemptions to the draft laws violate the Establishment Clause). At
least one scholar has noted that the Court's goal during the first 150 years of
Establishment Clause litigation "was to safeguard religion as government
made efforts to encroach upon it." John M. Flynn, Note, Constitutional Law-
Accommodation of Religion-The Answer to the Invocation Dilemma-Jager v.
Douglas County School District, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1045, 1052 (1989).
During this period, the Court upheld interaction between the church and state
largely based on the theory that such action was supported by America's long-
standing "religious tradition." Id.
18. See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 299 (1899). This case was the
first case involving the Establishment Clause to reach the Supreme Court.
The Court upheld the grant based on the theory that since the money was to
be used for the secular purpose of hospital operation, the grant of funds fell
within the parameters of permissible government action. See id.; see also Jef-
frey W. Stiltner, Note, Rethinking the Wall of Separation: Zobrest v. Catalina
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subsidize Catholic schools, 19 and approved of land grants and
monetary aid to support churches and missionary schools.20
However, as the nation evolved, states began to distance
themselves from involvement in religious affairs. Blasphemy
laws disappeared, as did Sunday closing laws and other tradi-
tional forms of government religious association.21 Towards
the middle of the nineteenth century, state governments began
to abandon their position as guardians of religious observance
and took a more neutral role in religious affairs. 22 In fact,
many states began writing the Establishment Clause into their
own constitutions, thus making state involvement with religion
unconstitutional for the first time.23 While several religious
adherents objected to this movement, 24 the general trend to-
ward separation of church and state had begun.
Foothills School District-Is This the End of Lemon?, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 823,
826 (1994).
19. See Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 81-82 (1908).
20. See id. The Court approved of these grants due to the fact that the
Native Americans would use the schools. See id at 79. Additionally, the
Court noted that the Native Americans had relinquished the land in question
to the federal government. See id. at 80. Consequently, the Court reasoned
that the money and land used for religious purposes was the Native Ameri-
cans' and was not attributable to the federal government, thus allowing it to
satisfy the requirements of the Establishment Clause. See id.; see also Lash,
supra note 15, at 1098 n.47 (discussing the potential problem of government
power over religion in land grants to Native Americans for the erection of
churches and missionary schools).
21. See Lash, supra note 15, at 1105-17.
22. See id. at 1117. Lash demonstrates that this separation between
church and state governments ironically coincided with one of the more relig-
ious eras of our country. He posits that this separation is attributable to "the
fragmentation of Protestant denominations and the incentive of religious mi-
norities to put a nonestablishment spin on the ... Establishment Clause." Id.
at 1118.
23. See id. at 1133. Lash cites as an example the Iowa Constitution,
which effectively copied the Establishment Clause from the federal Constitu-
tion (while substituting the words "General Assembly" for "Congress"). The
Establishment Clause as originally adopted did not prevent any state govern-
ment involvement with religion. In fact, many scholars claim that several
states refused to ratify the Constitution until a clause protecting the states'
traditional right to establish laws favorable to religion was included. See id.
at 1089-91.
24. See, e.g., id. at 1131-32. According to Lash, several religious organi-
zations objected to the "divorce of Christianity from the law of the land," id- at
1131, and even attempted to pass a constitutional amendment which overtly
declared the country's belief in God and the formation of a Christian govern-
ment. See id. at 1132 (citing 3 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURcHAND STATE IN
THE UNITED STATES 584-85 (1950)).
1810 [Vol. 83:1805
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B. THE MODERN ERA OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
The shift to secular state governments that began in the
1940s drastically accelerated in the modem era. With the
landmark decision of Everson v. Board of Education25 in 1947,
the Supreme Court incorporated the Establishment Clause
into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process guarantees,
making the clause applicable to state governments for the first
time.26 The Everson Court also held that the Establishment
Clause required government neutrality toward religion, rather
than hostility or support.27 In Everson, the Court began to re-
verse the accommodationist trend evidenced in earlier cases28
and stressed the importance of completely separating religion
and government by embracing Jefferson's "wall of separation"
metaphor.29
Everson thus marked the advent of an era in which the
Court "shifed... its focus ... from safeguarding religion in
25. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding the reimbursement of transportation ex-
penses to parents of parochial school children by a municipal school district).
26. See id. at 15.
27. Thus, just as fire and police services are extended to all institutions,
regardless of their religious nature, so too, could the state provide equally for
transportation of all students to school. See id. at 17. Justice Black, writing
for the Court, stated:
That Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations
with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not re-
quire the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be
used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.
Id. at 18. Justice Black believed that refusing to help with transportation ex-
penses for parochial students, while those attending public school were as-
sured free transportation, could discourage parents from sending their chil-
dren to private schools. See id. at 17. He felt that this measure did not result
in a contribution of money to the parochial schools, see id at 18, nor did it
support them. Rather, the program merely served the common interest of
transporting all children, regardless of which school they attended, "safely
and expeditiously to and from accredited schools," and thus did not violate the
dictates of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 18.
Bila writes that a neutrality standard prevents not only the favoring of
one religious sect over another but also a general preference for religion over
non-religion. See Bila, supra note 15, at 1549. Neutrality also prevents the
establishment of a state religion, but still allows religious establishments to
receive government aid that is distributed on a neutral basis. See id Aside
from these distinctions, the Court has struggled with what types of actions
indicate neutrality rather than preference or hostility. See id at 1549-50.
28. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
29. 330 U.S. at 18.
1999] 1811
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the public realm to removing religion from the public realm. 30
Unfortunately, the Court could not seem to articulate a test
which would reliably separate permissible government interac-
tion with religion from unconstitutional government involve-
ment.31 Instead, the Court engaged in a long series of ad hoc,
fact-specific analyses that produced illogical and contradictory
results.32 Thus, twenty years after Everson, little progress had
been made in clarifying Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
The relatively easy and unifying principles that had emerged
from early Establishment Clause jurisprudence had eroded
into a guessing game for legislatures and judges.
C. THE ADVENT OF THE FIRST ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TEST
In an attempt to clarify the Everson-era cases,33 the Court
adopted its first comprehensive test for adjudication of Estab-
lishment Clause issues in 1971, with its decision in Lemon v.
Kurtzman.34 While striking down two statutes involving state
aid to parochial schools,35 the Lemon Court noted that there
30. Stiltner, supra note 18, at 831 (citing Flynn, supra note 17, at 1054).
According to Stiltner, from the period of ratification of the clause until the
Everson decision, "the Court's concern was to protect religion from govern-
ment intrusion." Id. at 831. However, after Everson, a trend of separationism
seemed to permeate the Court's decisions.
31. See id.; Theodore C. Hirt, "Symbolic Union" of Church and State and
the "Endorsement" of Sectarian Activity: A Critique of Unwieldy Tools of Es-
tablishment Clause Jurisprudence, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 823, 824 (1989).
32. During this era the Court declared that a state could loan secular
textbooks to students attending parochial schools, see Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968), and upheld laws requiring businesses to close on
Sundays, see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,453 (1961). The Court also
prevented voluntary prayers, see Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962),
and religious classes, see Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203, 212 (1948), from being held in public schools, but approved of students'
release during the school day for religious instruction held off school grounds,
see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952). In fact, in practice the
Court's adoption of the neutrality principle began to evidence a belief that
government could not even indirectly support religion, but instead required
hostility toward religion rather than mere separation.
33. The Court stated in Lemon v. Kurtzman "that we can only dimly per-
ceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of consti-
tutional law." 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
34. Id. at 612-13.
35. Before the Court were two state statutes, one from Pennsylvania and
the other from Rhode Island. The Pennsylvania law allowed the state to pay
nonpublic schools, including those of a parochial nature, a portion of their ex-
penses for teachers' salaries and various other secular expenses. See id. at
609. The Rhode Island statute supplemented the salaries of teachers in pri-
vate schools by fifteen percent if they taught secular courses. See id. at 607;
1812 [Vol. 83:1805
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were "three main evils against which the Establishment
Clause was intended to afford protection: 'sponsorship, finan-
cial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in relig-
ious activity.'"36 The Court then articulated a three-part test to
evaluate government action: "First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose;37 second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;38
finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion. 39
In applying the Lemon test to the Pennsylvania and Rhode
Island statutes, the Court first determined that the statutes
did have a legitimate legislative purpose because they ensured
a minimum standard of secular education in all schools within
state boundaries. 4 0 The Court struck down the statutes after
declaring that both created excessive entanglement between
government and religion by requiring extensive government
monitoring to ensure that only secular purposes were being
advanced with state money.41
Although Lemon seemed to reconcile Everson's emphasis
on neutrality and separateness, 42 and to offer a clear approach
to Establishment Clause cases, the Lemon test proved trouble-
some in its application. Under Lemon, the Court handed down
see also April L. Ooughlin, Stark v. Independent School District No. 640:
Fabricating a Paper-Mache Wall Between Church and State, 31 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 1341, 1365-66 (1998).
36. 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668
(1970)).
37. Id. at 612. According to some scholars' analysis of cases subsequently
decided under the Lemon doctrine, government actions which have "a reason-
able secular purpose, even if it also has a substantial, or even primary, relig-
ious purpose," will be deemed constitutional. Michael D. Lieder, Religious
Pluralism and Education in Historical Perspective: A Critique of the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 813,
824(1987).
38. 403 U.S. at 612 (citations omitted). Stiltner explains that statutes
which merely provide inconsequential advantages to religion, but do not have
the advancement of religion as their main purpose, will survive attack under
this prong, because "Islome relationship between government and religious
organizations is inevitable.'" Stiltner, supra note 18, at 833 (quoting Lemon,
403 U.S. at 614).
39. 403 U.S. at 613. The Court declared in Lemon that these three test
have been "gleaned" from previous Establishment Clause cases. Id. at 612.
40. See id. at 613.
41. See id. at 618. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated that
the operation of these statutes would require state involvement in the schools'
accounting procedures and curriculum offerings. See id. at 621.
42. See Stiltner, supra note 18, at 831.
1999] 1813
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results just as contradictory and illogical as those following
Everson.43 In fact, several cases involving application of the
Lemon test seemed to contradict rulings from the Everson pe-
riod.44 Although Lemon seemed to provide clear guidelines, it
became apparent that in practice the test was unworkable.
D. LEMON BEGINS To SouR
Scholars, practitioners and members of the Court soon be-
gan to express their dissatisfaction with Lemon.45 However,
43. Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the confusion that application of the
Lemon test engendered when he stated in Wallace v. Jaffree that:
a State may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks
that contain maps of the United States, but the State may not lend
maps of the United States for use in geography class. A state may
lend textbooks on American colonial history, but it may not lend a
film on George Washington, or a film projector to show it in history
class .... A State may pay for bus transportation to religious schools
but may not pay for bus transportation from the parochial school to
the public zoo or natural history museum for a field trip. A State
may pay for diagnostic services conducted in the parochial school but
therapeutic services must be given in a different building....
472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
44. For instance, the Court prohibited states from providing books, maps,
charts, and globes to parochial schools, see Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349,
373 (1975), even though the Court had previously determined that states
could provide secular books directly to parochial school students, see Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968). The Court also seemed to contradict
itself when it held that the Establishment Clause allowed states to furnish
parochial schools with standardized testing, diagnostic services, and thera-
peutic services. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244, 248, 257 (1977).
Finally, the Court declared that states could not provide transportation for
religious schools' field trips, see id. at 254, a result that seemed irreconcilable
with Everson.
45. At least four current Justices have expressed their belief that Lemon
may no longer be viable: Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy.
See Stiltner, supra note 18, at 836 n.89. Most noticeably, Justice Rehnquist
has stated that the test incorrectly applies the Establishment Clause when
examined in the context of the original framers' intentions. See Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("If a constitu-
tional theory has no basis in the history of the amendment it seeks to inter-
pret, is difficult to apply, and yields unprincipled results, I see little use in
it."). Justice Scalia has also denounced the test. See Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987), (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (stating that "[olur Religion Clause ju-
risprudence has become bedeviled (so to speak) by reliance on formulaic ab-
stractions that are not derived from, but positively conflict with, our long-
accepted constitutional traditions" and that "[floremost among these has been
the so-called Lemon test").
Scholars also began to criticize the test and attacked each prong as un-
workable. Many claimed that the first prong of the test, requiring a secular
1814 [Vol. 83:1805
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rather than overrule the unworkable Lemon doctrine, the
Court simply began to move away from using the Lemon test.
In 1981, the Court started to redefine subtly various prongs of
the Lemon test, providing the first evidence that support for
the test was declining.4 6 The Court's most noticeable departure
appeared around 1990, when the Court conspicuously re-
worded the application of Lemon and indicated that it was
more of a signpost than a test.4 7 This result can be seen in
purpose, provided little protection because any sectarian purpose usually has
at least some corollary secular purpose that can be maintained, thus allowing
it to pass review. See, e.g., Stiltner, supra note 18, at 833. Scholars have also
claimed that this prong is irrelevant given the second prong of the test. These
theorists claim that any "governmental action... undertaken for a religious
purpose... will usually also have the effect of advancing religion... [thus
making it] unconstitutional under the second Lemon principle." Robert A.
Sedler, Understanding the Establishment Clause: The Perspective of Constitu-
tional Litigation, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1317, 1345 (1997).
The second prong of the Lemon test, requiring that government action
neither inhibit nor advance religion, has been criticized on separate grounds.
Scholars argue that the particular effects of a given state action are not often
readily apparent and will therefore depend on the Court's subjective valuejudgments. See Stiltner, supra note 18, at 833; Sedler, supra, at 1348. Fur-
thermore, it has been argued that many state laws can advance both secular
and religious purposes simultaneously. See Sedler, supra, at 1348. Therefore,
striking down a law that advances an important secular purpose simply be-
cause it also advances religion seems to take the Establishment Clause be-
yond its original intent.
The most vociferous criticism has been aimed at the third prong. The
"excessive entanglement prong" seems to be defined simply by cases that have
come before it, with no static principles or rules to determine when govern-
ment and religious interaction has reached the point of excessiveness. See,
e.g., Stiltner, supra note 18, at 835 (citing Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402,
420-21 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (claiming that the third prong is a
"Catch 22 paradox of its own creation, whereby aid must be supervised to en-
sure no entanglement but the supervision itself is held to cause entangle-
ment")).
46. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
795, 810 (1993).
47. Thomas Marvan Skousen states that "the Court had relegated the
Lemon test back to its role as 'no more than a helpful signpost' in dealing with
Establishment Clause challenges." Thomas Marvan Skousen, Comment and
Note, The Lemon in Smith v. Mobile County: Protecting Pluralism and Gen-
eral Education, 1997 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 69, 80 (1997); see also Paulsen, supra
note 46, at 817. In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Justice Blackmun wrote: "In
Lemon v. Kurtzman... the Court sought to refine these principles by focusing
on three 'tests' for determining whether a government practice violates the
Establishment Clause .... This trilogy of tests has been applied regularly in
the Court's later Establishment Clause cases." 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989). As
Professor Paulsen points out, "the Allegheny majority did not affirm Lemon as
the appropriate test. It merely noted the historical fact that Lemon has been
'applied regularly.' Paulsen, supra note 46, at 814-15.
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County of Allegheny v. ACLU48 and in Board of Education v.
Mergens,49 both cases in which the lead opinion mentioned
Lemon, but failed to garner the support of a majority of Justices.
The use of Lemon appeared to have reached an end in 1992,
with the decision set forth in Lee v. Weisman.50 Lee involved
the constitutionality of a religious invocation and prayer at a
high school graduation ceremony. In striking down the school's
incorporation of the prayer into the ceremony, the majority
opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, completely ignored the
Lemon test.51 In fact, Justice Scalia noted that Kennedy's de-
liberate decision to leave Lemon out signaled the Court's belief
in its interment.52
By focusing on the elementary objectives of the Establish-
ment Clause and using "minimum constitutional guarantees"
as the basis for his opinion, Kennedy was able to develop a two-
pronged coercion test to analyze the constitutionality of the
48. 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (determining that a nativity scene placed inside a
county courthouse was unconstitutional, while a menorah outside a govern-
ment building was not). The case produced five separate opinions, with the
main opinion, written by Justice Blackmun, producing majority support in
only two sections. See Paulsen, supra note 46, at 814. Several members of
the Court seemed to apply an endorsement test developed by Justice
O'Connor, see id. at 815 and infra note 62 and accompanying text, while oth-
ers seemed to support a test devised by Justice Kennedy in the dissent which
stated:
[Glovernment may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any
religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding hos-
tility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a
degree that it in fact establishes a state religion or religious faith, or
tends to do so.
492 U.S. at 817 (citations omitted).
49. 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990) (upholding the constitutionality of the Equal
Access Act, which permits religious groups to meet on public facilities on the
same basis as secular groups). In this case, Lemon also failed to command a
majority of the Justices. See id. The lead opinion, written by Justice
O'Connor, "applied Lemon... without embracing it." Paulsen, supra note 46,
at 818. As Professor Paulsen writes: "[Tihe doctrinal significance of Mergens
was the absence of a majority of the Court willing to apply Lemon even when
it would make no difference to the outcome." Id. at 819. Rehnquist, White,
Kennedy and Scalia seemed to remain supportive of Kennedy's coercive test.
See id.; infra note 54 and accompanying text.
50. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
51. See id. at 586.
52. Justice Scalia declared: "The Court today demonstrates the irrele-
vance of Lemon by essentially ignoring it, and the interment of that case may
be the one happy byproduct of the Court's otherwise lamentable decision." Id
at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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prayer at issue.5 3 Justice Kennedy stated that "at a minimum,
the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise" or
authorize the establishment of a national religion.5 4 Applying
these principles, Kennedy declared that undisputed concep-
tions of the Establishment Clause guaranteed the students in
Lee freedom from religious exercise mandated by the coercive
power of the state. Therefore, the case could be decided with-
out visiting the controversial questions "dividing [the Court] in
recent cases."55 In fact, Justice Kennedy believed the Lee policy
was in such flagrant violation of the Constitution that the
Court could invalidate it simply by looking at "controlling
precedent," rather than determining the full scope of permissi-
ble government action under the Establishment Clause.56
'[Rieconsidering the general constitutional framework by
which public schools' efforts to accommodate religion are
measured"57 would not be necessary. Justice Kennedy's avoid-
ance of the Lemon test, coupled with his evasion of controver-
sial Establishment Clause issues, subtly illustrates the Court's
belief that Lemon is no longer applicable. However, it also
demonstrates the Court's inability to agree on the new cohesive
framework that will replace Lemon as the baseline for Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence.
53. Justice Kennedy stated that:
These dominant facts mark and control the confines of our decision:
State officials direct the performance of a formal religious exercise at
promotional and graduation ceremonies for secondary schools. Even
for those students who object to religious exercise, their attendance
and participation in the state sponsored religious activity are in a fair
and real sense obligatory, though the school district does not require
attendance as a condition for receipt of the diploma.
Lee, 505 U.S. at 586, quoted in ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ.,
84 F.3d 1471, 1479 (3d Cir. 1996).
54. 505 U.S. at 587 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
Professor Paulsen asserts that this test is simply a version of the coercion test
he originally adopted in Allegheny. See Paulsen, supra note 46, at 822. Al-
though Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, White and Thomas dissented from Justice
Kennedy's opinion, their differences seem to be over Kennedy's inclusion of
social pressure as coercion rather than the coercion test itself. See id. at 825.
55. 505 U.S. at 586.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 587.
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E. ABANDONMENT OF LEMON LEADS TO CONFUSION AND
INCONSISTENCY
Although Lee appeared to represent a new direction in Es-
tablishment Clause cases, the Supreme Court has still not ex-
plicitly overruled Lemon, nor has it developed a new, compre-
hensive doctrine that would aid lower courts in deciding the
wide range of issues that arise under the Establishment
Clause. 58 The Court has taken relatively few religion cases in
recent years, with no clear pattern emerging. The outcome in
each case seems extremely uncertain, and as a consequence,
anomalous results have occurred. These recent cases have up-
held the entrance of public employees into private schools for
the first time,59 struck down a separate school district made up
solely of members of a culturally distinct religious sect,60 and
approved the use of public space for religious messages on the
same access policies of those allowed to use the space for non-
religious messages.61 The demise of Lemon, therefore, has led
58. Michael McConnell, a leading Establishment Clause scholar, asserts
that the Court has finally understood "that its rigorously separationist picture
of the intention and actions of the Founding Fathers was seriously misleading
as a matter of history." McConnell, supra note 15, at 933.
59. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993). This
case involved the district providing a publicly funded sign-language inter-
preter for a deaf child attending a private school. See id- at 4. The Court
noted that the placement of the district employee at the parochial school was
dependent on the choice of the parents and stated that "we have consistently
held that government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad
class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to
an Establishment Clause challenge just because sectarian institutions may
also receive an attenuated financial benefit." Id- at 18.
60. See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 710 (1994). Here, the
school board had established a special district for a religious sect that had ob-jected to sending its children with special education needs to secular schools.
See id. at 690. The Justices did not seem to conform to any one test in strik-
ing down the district, but did seem to feel that the religious sect was imper-
missibly benefited by creation of the special district. See Sedler, supra note
45, at 1331.
6L See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,
770 (1995); Rosenberger v. Rector of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819,
846 (1995). In Capitol Square, the Court upheld the placement of a Latin
cross on a statehouse plaza based on the theory of equal access for all dis-
plays. 515 U.S. at 770. The seven-to-two decision set forth two differing ra-
tionales. Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer retained the use of a test set
forth in Allegheny. See id at 783-94. It allowed the symbol as long as an out-
side objector would not feel the state was sponsoring religious symbols. In
this case, since other symbols were permitted, such a purpose could not be at-
tributable to the state. See Sedler, supra note 45, at 1334. Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Rehnquist upheld the display based on a new per se
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to even more confusion over the Establishment Clause. Each
Justice seems to favor a particular test, with no one test gar-
nering majority support.62
rule that "so long as the display was sponsored by a private entity and took
place in a public forum open to all on equal terms, there could be no govern-
mental endorsement of religion." Id. at 1333-34; see also Joiner, supra note
10, at 540.
Rosenberger upheld the payment of university funds to student organiza-
tions with a religious focus, when all other campus groups had been awarded
such funds. The Court upheld the decision by a five-to-four majority, finding
that to refuse to make funds available only to religious organizations was a
form of viewpoint discrimination. See id. at 845-46. Because the funds bene-
fited all organizations neutrally, religion was not impermissibly advanced.
See id at 843-44.
62. Chief Justice Rehnquist appears to support a test that returns to his-
torical roots because he believes the Court has "misplaced reliance on Thomas
Jefferson's notion of a %all of separation' between church and state." Stiltner,
supra note 18, at 838-39. Rehnquist would instead prefer a test that makes
the Establishment Clause simply a limitation on the government's ability to
establish a national religion or prefer one religious sect over another. See id.
at 839. Rehnquist states: "nothing in the Establishment Clause requires the
government to be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion, nor does
that Clause prohibit Congress or the States from pursuing legitimate secular
ends through nondiscriminatory sectarian means." Id. at 839-40 (quoting
Wallace v. Jaffiee, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
Justice Scalia has preliminarily supported Justice Rehmquist's idea of his-
torical underpinnings and similarly places much faith in tradition. See id. at
840. His test, however, like Kennedy's, places emphasis on preventing any
government coercion of religion. See id. Although Kennedy and Scalia seem
to disagree about what exactly constitutes coercion, this test would uphold
any state involvement with religion that does not coerce religious participa-
tion. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 631-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting); supra note 54 and
accompanying text. Scalia takes a much narrower view of coercion, limiting it
to the more traditional forms of religious oppression namely, "coercion of re-
ligious orthodoxy and... financial support by force of law and threat of pen-
alty." 505 U.S. at 640. Kennedy, however, would include social pressure or
compulsion as impermissible government coercion. See id. at 593; see also
Stiltuer, supra note 18, at 841. Kennedy feels that "absent coercion, the risk
of infringement of religious liberty by passive or symbolic accommodation is
minimal." Stiltner, supra note 18, at 841 (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 662).
O'Connor has advanced yet another test that is, in effect, a "refinement"
of Lemon. Known as the "Endorsement Test," this revision prevents any mes-
sage that would convey a government endorsement of religion, and also pre-
vents excessive entanglement. See id. at 840-41. O'Connor collapses the first
two prongs of Lemon into one inquiry in which she asks "whether govern-
ment's purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute actually conveys
a message of endorsement." Id. at 841. She continues to utilize the third
prong of Lemon as it was originally developed. See id. This test has gained
the support of various other members of the Court and seemed to be used by a
majority in Wallace. See id.
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F. SCHOOL PRAYER: A PERFECT EXAMPLE OF THE CONFUSION
The Supreme Court's failure to provide cohesive and con-
sistent Establishment Clause jurisprudence has left lower
courts mired in uncertainty. Unsure of whether Lemon is still
applicable, most courts have continued to use the test, waiting
for a definitive answer from the Supreme Court. This confu-
sion has most noticeably arisen when the issues of public edu-
cation and religious expression are intertwined.
In particular, the issue of school prayer at public gradua-
tion ceremonies became controversial almost immediately fol-
lowing the Lee decision. After Lee, the Supreme Court remand-
ed Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District,63 which
was awaiting certiorari, to the circuit court for decision in ac-
cordance with Lee. In Jones, the Fifth Circuit was faced with a
school board "resolution" which allowed senior class members
to choose student volunteers to deliver a "nonsectarian" invoca-
tion at graduation.64 Noting with some irreverence that the
Supreme Court has failed to develop a cohesive approach to the
Establishment Clause in recent years, 65 the Fifth Circuit ap-
plied the Lee analysis and determined that the Clear Creek
"resolution" was constitutional. 66 The Fifth Circuit declared
that because the students, rather than the school, had voted to
hold an invocation at their graduation ceremony, the prayers
in Jones were distinguishable from Lee.67 The court also em-
phasized that the students' participation in the decision
whether to include an invocation in the ceremony diminished
any coercive effect that arose from "psychological pressure."68
Finally, the court declared that the Clear Creek resolution was
63. 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992).
64. See id. at 964.
65. See id. at 966 ("Nevertheless it is neither our object nor our place to
opine whether the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence is good, fair or
useful."). The Fifth Circuit also noted that "in the time between Lemon and
Lee, the Court has used five tests to determine whether public schools' in-
volvement with religion violates the Establishment Clause." Id.
66. See id. at 972. The court also determined the policy to be constitu-
tional under the Lemon test and the endorsement test.
67. See id. The court stated that "[tihe practical result of our decision,
viewed in light of Lee, is that a majority of students can do what the State
acting on its own cannot do to incorporate prayer in public high school
graduation ceremonies." Id. On the second appeal to the Supreme Court, cer-
tiorari was denied. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 967
(1993).
68. 977 F.2d at 971.
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directed at graduating seniors who are much "less impression-
able than younger students," making the coercive effect of the
invocation similar to other "innocuous" religious references
that pervade our government.6 9
After the Fifth Circuit's decision, it appeared that gradua-
tion prayer would remain constitutional under the newly-
minted Lee analysis as long as the choice to include religious
expression was left solely to students. However, shortly after
Jones, the Ninth Circuit weighed in with a contrary position.
In Harris v. Joint School District No. 241,70 the Court of Ap-
peals concluded that even though students voted on the prayer
at issue, the administration's involvement was closely inter-
twined with administration of the prayer, therefore raising it
to the level of coercion observed in Lee.7 1 Most significantly,
the Ninth Circuit noted that although the decision to include
prayer was given to students, "ultimate[ I control[ ]" of the
graduation was vested in the school officials22 Furthermore,
the court noted that students were allowed to decide whether
an invocation should be included in their ceremony only be-
cause the state delegated its authority and allowed such a de-
cision.73 Accordingly, the court noted that school administra-
tion could not avoid the constraints of the Establishment
Clause simply by allowing students to make an unconstitu-
69. Id- (quoting Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 235 (1990)).
The Fifth Circuit cited the Supreme Court's opening, "God save the United
States and this Honorable Court," and determined that these references to
religion lack any attempt to coerce religious orthodoxy. Id.
70. 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1993).
7L See id. at 459. In rejecting the constitutionality of such prayers, the
court claimed that the state retained ultimate control over the prayers be-
cause the state had delegated decisionmaking power to the students. The
court also said that "[situdents are obligated to attend and participate in
graduation prayers, either by bowing their heads or maintain[ing] a respectful
silence, at Grangeville High graduation as at the high school commencement
discussed in Lee." Thomas A. Schweitzer, The Progeny of Lee v. Weisman:
Can Student-Invited Prayer at Public School Graduations Still Be Constitu-
tional?, 9 BYU J. PUB. L. 291, 299 (1995) (citing Harris, 41 F.3d at 457). Har-
ris was ultimately vacated as moot by the Supreme Court. See Harris v. Joint
Sch. Dist. No. 241, 515 U.S. 1154, 1154-55 (1995).
72. Harris, 41 F.3d at 454. The court noted that the school retained
authority over the "precise contents of the program, the speeches, the timing,
the movements, the dress and the decorum of the students." Id. (citing Lee,
505 U.S. at 597). The court also noted the fact that the school provides the
funds necessary to hold commencement. See id.
73. See id.
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tional decision.74 The Ninth Circuit held that these factors
combined to make the policy in Harris a coercive religious ex-
ercise and thus unconstitutional under Lee.
Although the Ninth and Fifth circuits have taken opposing
positions on the issue of student-initiated graduation prayer,
they are not alone. Many district courts have also come up
with conflicting decisions on similar fact patterns.75
H. THE THIRD CIRCUIT JOINS THE FRAY:
ACLU V. BLACK HORSE PIKE REGIONAL
BOARD OF EDUCATION
In the spring of 1993, the Black Horse School District
adopted a program, known as Policy IKFD,76 which allowed
student prayer at graduation ceremonies only if a majority of
the senior class desired such a prayer. The policy allowed stu-
dents to vote for a prayer at graduation, a moment of silence,
or for "nothing at all."77 Senior class member Edward Ross
protested Policy IKFD, after his class voted to include prayer
in their upcoming graduation ceremony.78 Ross, along with the
74. See id. at 455. The court stated that "elected officials cannot absolve
themselves of a constitutional duty by delegating their responsibilities to a
non-governmental entity." Id.
75. Compare, e.g., Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097(E.D. Va. 1993) (declaring that allowing students to decide whether or not to
include prayer at graduation violates the Establishment Clause), with Adler v.
Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (upholding the in-
clusion of prayer by student selection at graduation ceremonies).
76. The school district began to reexamine its policy of including prayer in
graduation ceremonies after the decision in Lee v. Weisman. See ACLU v.
Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1474 (3d. Cir. 1996). The
Superintendent of Schools developed Policy IKFD in an effort to conform with
Lee and submitted his proposal to the board for approval. See id. The first
version of the policy, Version A, prohibited any type of prayer at the ceremo-
nies. See id. The Board did not approve this policy and directed school offi-
cials to develop a policy that would conform with both Lee and Jones v. Clear
Creek Independent School District, which had recently held student-initiated
prayer to be constitutional. See id. at 1474-75. The administration developed
two further versions of Policy IKFD for board approval. See id. at 1475. The
first, version D, allowed students to decide if prayer should be allowed at
graduation and also allowed students to determine "the nature of any such
prayer." Id. The second version, which was rejected by the Board, prohibited
prayer but did allow for a moment of silence. See id. After receiving approval
by a group of student representatives, the Board unanimously adopted Ver-
sion D. See id.
77. Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1474.
78. See id. at 1475-76. Shortly before graduation, the principal detailed
the operation of the new policy to the students during a morning address
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ACLU, sought to enjoin the prayer on the grounds that the
policy was unconstitutional.7 9
The Third Circuit dismissed the school board's argument
that the prayer policy was intended to protect the free speech
rights of its students.80 The court declared that although Pol-
icy IKFD allowed every student input on the decision whether
to have prayer at graduation, the program sacrificed the rights
of the minority at the expense of the majority-a result pro-
hibited by the First Amendment.81 The Third Circuit held that
graduation was not a public forum that provided for a multi-
plicity of views.82 As a result, the court determined that Policy
IKFD did not in fact support free speech.83
The Third Circuit then analyzed the Black Horse policy
under the doctrine of Lee v. Weisman. The majority found that
the state exercised impermissible control over the religious
component of the ceremony because the commencement was
held on school property and state officials retained complete
power over the sequence of the graduation program.8 4 Addi-
tionally, the court held that the students' participation in the
decision to include prayer did not distinguish this case from
Lee because students only voted on the school prayer because
the school officials agreed to delegate this authority to them.85
The Third Circuit then declared that the policy also failed the
given over a school-wide intercom. See id. at 1475. The senior class president
then explained that a poll would be taken of the senior class the following day
in accordance with Policy IKFD. See id. The poll resulted in 128 students
voting for prayer, 120 for a moment of silence, and 20 for neither. See id. As
the prayer option had garnered the most votes, the senior class officers then
selected a student to read a prayer at graduation from a group of volunteers.
See id.; see also supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
79. See Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1476.
80. See id. at 1477.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 1478. The circuit court dismissed the school board's reli-
ance on free speech rights, stating that graduation was not a public forum.
See id. The court relied in part on the board's refusal to allow the safe sex
speech, and declared, therefore, that Policy IKFD could not legitimately be
interpreted as a promotion of the students' free speech rights. See id. at 1477-
78.
83. See id. at 1478.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 1479. The court quoted Lee in stating that the "school offi-
cials necessarily 'retain a high degree of control over the precise contents of
the program, the speeches, the timing, the movements, the dress, and the de-
corum of the students.' Id. (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597
(1992)).
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second prong of the Lee test because it coerced students into
participating in the religious exercise. 86 In making this deter-
mination, the court adopted the rationale expressed by Justice
Kennedy in Lee and declared attendance at high school
graduation to be an involuntary choice. 87 The court declared
that the school's control of the ceremony, coupled with the peer
pressure emanating from others in the audience, forced stu-
dents into either standing and/or remaining silent during the
prayer.88 According to the Third Circuit, this result constituted
coerced participation in the religious exercise because the sen-
iors had no other way to express their disagreement with the
prayer.89 Finding the Black Horse Policy to have failed both
prongs of the Lee test, the court declared the policy unconstitu-
tional under the Establishment Clause.
The Black Horse court then examined the policy under-
girding the Lemon test. Although the court noted that Lemon
was of questionable value, it stated that the test was preceden-
tial authority, thereby mandating its application absent an ex-
plicit overruling by the Supreme Court.90 The Third Circuit
rejected the idea that the prayer was necessary to serve a sol-
emnizing function and thus found that Policy IKFD did not
have a secular purpose as required by the first prong of Lemon.
Further, the court was not convinced that the free speech
rights of the students took precedence in this area. 91 The court
also found the policy to violate the second prong of the Lemon
test because it impermissibly endorsed religion by conveying
the message that religion is preferred over non-religion.92
86. See id. at 1480.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id. According to the court, "t]his pressure, though subtle and in-
direct, can be as real as any overt compulsion." Id. (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at
592-93). In making this finding the court noted its disagreement with a re-
cent Fifth Circuit decision that had declared a similar policy constitutional
based on the fact that graduation was a once in a lifetime event with mature
students who were less immune to coercion. See id. at 1482. Instead, the
court embraced the rationale of the Ninth Circuit, which declared that "school
officials cannot divest themselves of constitutional responsibility by allowing
students to make crucial decisions." Id. at 1483 (quoting Harris v. Joint Sch.
Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 455 (9th Cir. 1994)).
90. See id. at 1484.
91. See id. The court declared that, although prayer has been approved
by the Supreme Court as a means of solemnizing legislative sessions, this
purpose could not be used to save the Black Horse policy. See id. at 1485.
92. The court stated that although the "disclaimer that is required by
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I. STUDENT-INITIATED PRAYER:
NON-COERCIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
Considering the current status of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence,93 one can hardly blame the Black Horse court for
its confused approach. However, the Black Horse court did
have an advantage that many other courts deciding Estab-
lishment Clause controversies lack: the Supreme Court had al-
ready decided a similar issue of graduation prayer, and in so
doing laid down a new framework for interpreting this par-
ticular Establishment Clause controversy.94 With its landmark
decision in Lee v. Weisman, the Court provided a mandate for
lower courts to follow in graduation prayer cases. Unfortu-
nately, the Black Horse majority extended the methodology
employed by the Supreme Court and unnecessarily utilized the
Lemon test in its analysis of Black Horse's graduation cere-
mony. Additionally, by failing to adopt the most sensible defi-
nition of coercion, the Third Circuit misinterpreted Lee and er-
roneously declared the Black Horse program unconstitutional.
A. APPLICATION OF THE LEMON DOCTRINE CONTRADICTS
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
The Third Circuit erred when it applied a Lemon analysis
to the school district's graduation prayer policy.95 Although the
Version D does weigh in favor of the Board's position under a Lemon analy-
sis... it does not weigh so heavily as to neutralize the counterweight of the
advantage the policy gives religious speech over secular speech." Id. at 1487.
The court declined to analyze whether the policy failed the third prong of the
Lemon test, which prohibits excessive government entanglement with relig-
ion, because it considered the fact that the prayer program failed the first two
prongs of the test sufficient to declare the policy unconstitutional. See id. at
1488.
93. Various scholars have described the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence as a veritable mass of inconsistency and confusion. One
prominent professor even went so far as to say:
the Court has managed to unite those who stand at polar opposites
on the results that the Court reaches; a strict separationist and a
zealous accommodationist are likely to agree that the Supreme Court
would not recognize an establishment of religion if it took life and bit
the Justices.
Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHi. L. REv.
115, 115 (1992) (quoting LEVY, supra note 10, at 163).
94. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). In Lee, Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, adopted a version of the coercion test the Court had
previously set forth in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
95. See ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1483-
88 (3rd Cir. 1996).
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Supreme Court has never explicitly overruled the Lemon test,
its informal demise has been noted by both scholars and sev-
eral members of the Court.96 The inapplicability of this test to
graduation prayer cases can hardly be disputed given that a
majority of Justices failed to utilize the test in Lee.97 Writing
for a majority of the Court in Lee, Justice Kennedy announced
that analysis under the Lemon test was completely unneces-
sary.98 Rather, he felt the case could be decided simply by ex-
amining the basic limitations on coercive government action
that have evolved from previous Establishment Clause juris-
prudence.99 The Black Horse court should have followed the
Supreme Court's example and declined to apply the Lemon
test;100 instead, the court should have utilized the coercion test
as the sole basis of its decision.
B. TiE COERCION TEST IS THE CORRECT ANALYTICAL TOOL FOR
DECIDING GRADUATION PRAYER CONTROVERSIES
The coercion test involves the intersection of two distinct
ideas: (1) state control of a religious exercise and (2) coerced
participation in the exercise. 101 Not only is this test controlling
96. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
97. 505 U.S. at 577. In fact, only one justice even mentioned the applica-
tion of the Lemon standards-Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion,
wrote that the Court has relied on Lemon standards since 1971, but he then
failed to apply the test to the issue at hand. See id. at 603-04 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
98. See id. at 586-87.
99. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (detailing Kennedy's
belief that this level of coercion is enough to constitute government estab-
lishment of religion without redefining the current decisional framework).
100. However, even if Lemon were to apply, the Black Horse dissent ar-
gued that such a program could be found constitutional under Lemon. Judge
Mansmann, writing for the dissent, found that the program had three sepa-
rate secular purposes: free speech protection, solemnization of the ceremony,
and encouraging responsible citizenship. See Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1494
(Mansmann, J., dissenting) (discussing the education of students about the
"effects of current constitutional jurisprudence on their public behavior"). He
also believed that the policy did not endorse religion because it was "as hospi-
table to religion as it [was] to irreligion." Id. at 1496. Finally, he found that
excessive government entanglement was avoided since the policy appeared to
involve a "virtual total absence of administrative entanglement of any sort."
Id. at 1497. This notion of a lack of entanglement is supported by the fact
that the students themselves conducted a vote and were responsible for
choosing volunteers to lead the vote while school officials were conspicuously
absent during the whole procedure.
101. See id. at 1479. The Black Horse court derived these two prongs di-
rectly from Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lee. See supra note 53 and accompa-
[Vol. 83:18051826
GRADUATION PRAYER
for lower courts by virtue of its application in Lee v. Weisman,
it is also the most historically accurate test for Establishment
Clause jurisprudence because it fulfills the normative aspira-
tions that the Framers intended to embody in the First
Amendment.1 02
Modem Supreme Court jurisprudence has limited the
guarantees afforded all citizens under the First Amendment by
interpreting the religion clauses to contain protections that are
inherently contradictory. 03 Since the nonestablishment prin-
ciple prohibits any government special treatment for, or in-
volvement with, religious institutions, application of the Es-
tablishment Clause has been read to prohibit many of the
religious accommodations guaranteed by the Free Exercise
provision. 0 4 However, interpretation of the Establishment
Clause through a coercion analysis resolves this tension.105 By
allowing government action that is neutral toward religion,
rather than mandating the total evisceration of church and
state, the Supreme Court will ameliorate the unnecessary and
unintended hostility toward religion that has resulted from its
jurisprudence. This approach will also reverse the separa-
tionist trend that has pervaded Establishment Clause juris-
prudence in modem times.1 06
Under a coercion interpretation of the Establishment
Clause, government may be connected with religious exercises
as long as it does not use its power to compel participation in
such exercises or display an attitude that seems to favor relig-
nying text. Professor Paulsen describes this test as one which prohibits gov-
ernment from compelling financial support to a religious body or from re-
quiring participation in religious exercise. See Paulsen, supra note 46, at 797.
Professor Paulsen asserts that this test is simply a version of the coercion test
Justice Kennedy originally adopted in Allegheny. See id. at 822. Although
Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, White and Thomas dissented from Justice Ken-
nedy's opinion, their differences seem to be over Kennedy's inclusion of social
pressure as coercion rather than the coercion test itself. See id. at 825.
102. See infra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Joiner, supra note 10, at 507; Paulsen, supra note 46, at 795.
104. Examples of this tension can be seen by examining cases decided un-
der the Free Exercise Clause. In Sherbert v. Verner, for example, the Su-
preme Court held that special religious exemptions are sometimes required by
the Free Exercise Clause. 374 U.S. 398, 408-10 (1963). The Court found that
unemployment compensation must not be barred to those whose religion for-
bids work on Saturdays, see id. at 409-10, a result that seems to support re-
ligion and thus violate the Establishment Clause.
105. See infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; McConnell, supra note 93,
at 189.
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ion over non-religion.107 By focusing on limiting government's
coercive powers in the area of religious expression, this ap-
proach resolves the inherent tension that currently exists with
the Free Exercise Clause. The Free Exercise provision guaran-
tees everyone the right to religious worship, while the Estab-
lishment Clause prevents the government from establishing a
preferred or mandatory religion. 108 Under this view, "[t]he Es-
tablishment Clause prohibits the use of the coercive power of
the state to prescribe religious exercise; [while] the Free Exer-
cise Clause prohibits the use of government compulsion to pro-
scribe religious exercise." 109
Historical evidence of the Framers' intentions supports
this interpretation of the clause.110 James Madison, who origi-
nally proposed the First Amendment, stated that the clauses
meant only that "Congress should not establish a religion, and
enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to
worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience.""'
Furthermore, this interpretation is supported by actions of the
federal government in the period surrounding the adoption of
the Bill of Rights.l2 Government, far from being strictly secu-
lar, was involved in many different aspects of religion. How-
ever, it drew the line by avoiding the use of its power to coerce
religious exercise."3 Reading the Establishment Clause to re-
107. See generally Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S 577 (1992); McConnell, supra
note 15; Paulsen, supra note 46.
108. According to Professor Paulsen, this interpretation places the two
clauses in direct complement to each other and "protect[s] a single central lib-
erty-religious freedom-from two different angles." Paulsen, supra note 46,
at 798.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. Professor McConnell writes that "[if Madison's explanations to the
First Congress are any guide, compulsion is not just an element, it is the es-
sence of an establishment." McConnell, supra note 15, at 937.
111. Bila, supra note 15, at 1544 (citation omitted) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF
CONG. 731 J. Gales ed., 1834)).
112. For example, the use of military chaplains, legislative prayer sessions,
and Presidential Thanksgiving proclamations all evidence the intertwining
relationship between the church and state. See supra note 15 and accompa-
nying text.
113. Professor McConnell writes that the aforementioned actions by the
framers "are much easier to understand if one sees religious coercion as the
fimdamental evil against which the clause is directed." McConnell, supra note
15, at 939. Indeed, the idea of the Establishment Clause came primarily as a
response to nationalized churches and forced support of religion in the Euro-
pean countries the framers had deserted. Bila notes in her article that the
religion clauses were a direct effort by the framers to prevent the coercive re-
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quire strict separationism in effect requires the government to
be hostile to the concept of religion, 114 an idea that contradicts
the notions of liberty and freedom the Framers were attempt-
ing to promote." 5 A majority of Supreme Court justices have
recognized this dichotomy and have therefore endorsed the co-
ercion test for use in Establishment Clause cases. 116
C. APPLICATION OF THE COERCION TEST RESULTS IN A FINDING
OF CONSTITUTIONALITY FOR THE BLACK HORSE PROGRAM
Using the coercion test, an Establishment Clause violation
occurs in the context of graduation prayer only when a state
ligious orthodoxy that European governments had engaged in for centuries.
See Bila, supra note 15, at 1543. Many state governments had begun to favor
particular religious sects in the tradition of European monarchies and many
early colonists felt that result should be prevented. See id. at 543; see also
McConnell, supra note 15, at 939.
114. Many school districts have distanced themselves from any form of re-
ligious expression, fearing that such a connection would be perceived as a
government endorsement of religion. However, this position of strict separa-
tion can also be seen to coerce students toward belief in an atheist viewpoint
since it conveys to students that religion is inappropriate or unnecessary to
civilian life. See Daniel N. McPherson, Student-Initiated Religious Expression
in the Public Schools: The Need for a Wider Opening in the Schoolhouse Gate,
30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 393, 420 (1997).
115. Professor McConnell writes that "[v]irtually the entire spectrum of
opinion at the time of the adoption of the First Amendment expected the citi-
zens to draw upon religion as a principal source of moral guidance for both
their private and their public lives." McConnell, supra note 93, at 191. Ac-
cording to McConnell, the Establishment Clause merely sought to ensure
freedom to pursue whatever religious "guidance" they preferred without gov-
ernment interference or preference for a particular sect. See id. The idea
that government would completely ignore religion seems contrary to the ide-
als of a time when religion was one of the primary influences on society.
President Adams said that "[olur Constitution was made only for a moral and
religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other."
Joiner, supra note 10, at 569 (citation omitted).
116. Although four justices dissented from Kennedy's majority opinion in
Lee, they seemed to disagree not with the use of the coercion test itself, but
rather with Kennedy's inclusion of indirect social pressure in the definition of
coercion. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 642 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Scalia, who was joined by Justices Rehnquist, White, and Tho-
mas, wrote, "while I have no quarrel with the Court's general proposition that
the Establishment Clause 'guarantees that government may not coerce any-
one to support or participate in religion or its exercise,' I see no warrant for
expanding the concept of coercion beyond acts backed by threat of penalty."
Id. (citation omitted). In fact, Justice Rehnquist wrote as early as 1985 that
the religion clauses "primarily seek to prevent coerced religious adherence
and to guarantee the free exercise of one's chosen religious beliefs." Bila, su-
pra note 15, at 1535 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 50 (1985)).
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(1) controls a religious exercise and (2) uses this control to
compel participation by citizens. Although the Black Horse
court correctly identified the major tenets of the test, it incor-
rectly applied the test by attributing coercive action to the
state rather than to private individuals. In doing so, the court
erroneously declared the program unconstitutional.
1. State Control of the Graduation Prayer
In Lee, the Court found that state control of the graduation
prayer made the religious exercise an unconstitutional viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause. 117 However, several facts
distinguish Black Horse from Lee and lead to the conclusion
that the state in Black Horse was only a neutral actor in the
religious prayer, rather than a controlling entity enforcing re-
ligious orthodoxy.
In Lee, the school principal chose whether to include a
prayer, who would give the prayer, and what would be the gen-
eral content of the prayer.118 In contrast, the Black Horse pro-
gram purposely avoided all state control of the program. The
choice of whether or not to have prayer, a moment of silence, or
neither of these options, was left entirely to a student vote.119
Additionally, in Black Horse, a similar group of students select-
ed student volunteers to give the prayer, and a disclaimer was
printed on the graduation programs stating that the religious
exercise did not reflect the beliefs of the school board, staff, or
other students.120
Therefore, unlike the program in Lee, the administration
(i.e., the state) did not have any control over the process at is-
sue in Black Horse. Although the board proposed the program
allowing the vote, the decision accurately reflected students'
wishes, negating any allegation that it was a purely semantic
exercise. 121 Rather, the board simply tried to accommodate a
desire held by a large portion of the community to include a re-
117. See Lee, 505 U.S at 577.
118. See id. at 587.
119. See ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1474
(3d Cir. 1996).
120. See id.
121. In fact, the district court judge emphasized that he had earlier sus-
pected that the policy was simply an attempt by the school board to favor par-
ticular religious beliefs. However, the evidence indicated that the policy was
truly motivated by a desire to accommodate student wishes and was not sim-
ply a "sham" to cover religious preferences. See id. at 1491 n.2.
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ligious element in the graduation ceremony, a significant event
in the lives of many students. 122 This desire was evidenced by
the "longstanding tradition" of including nonsectarian invoca-
tion and benediction in previous ceremonies without any pro-
test. If this desire was now absent, as indicated by a majority
vote, the prayer would not be held, regardless of the school
board's wishes. The state made its position on the prayer
clear-it did not support or discourage religious expression, but
simply stood by as a neutral observer. This concept of neutral-
ity is exactly what the Framers intended when they proposed
the Establishment Clause. 123 To require the state to prevent
such a religious exercise would in effect mandate state hostility
toward religion-a result in tension with the Free Exercise
Clause. 124 Therefore, by remaining neutral and removing itself
from control of the prayer, the Black Horse program clears the
first prong of the coercion test.
2. Coerced Participation in the Graduation Exercise
To pass the coercion test set forth in Lee, a graduation
prayer must not only remove state control of the religious exer-
cise, but it must also lack any coercive state action that would
compel student participation in the exercise. 25 In Lee, the Jus-
tices espoused two competing definitions of government coer-
cion, leaving lower courts with the job of deciding which view
most accurately reflects the spirit of the Establishment
Clause. 126 In Lee, a fractured majority struck down the specific
graduation prayer policy based on the perceived indirect social
coercion that it believed would force students to stand and/or
remain silent.127 The majority stated that these circumstances
constituted coercion under the Establishment Clause because
this peer pressure could itself be construed to require partici-
pation.128 The dissent in Lee, led by Justice Scalia, offered a
122. Some courts allow this "once in a lifetime event" distinction to tip the
balance in favor of constitutionality. See, e.g., Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub.
Sch. Dist., 864 F. Supp. 1473, 1489 (S.D. Miss. 1994), affd, 88 F.3d 274 (5th
Cir. 1996). The rationale evoked for this distinction is that religious exercises
serve a solemnization purpose appropriate for these life-altering rituals that
is not needed at other functions such as sporting events. See id
123. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
125. See Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1479.
126. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992).
127. See id.
128. See id According to Kennedy, the indirect pressure to stand and
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more normative interpretation of the coercion doctrine. As
Justice Scalia viewed it, his interpretation would relieve state
entities of responsibility for the actions of private citizens. 29
The Justices in this group believed that a definition of coercion
which attributed indirect social pressure to official government
action went beyond the bounds of the Establishment Clause. 130
According to the dissent, government coercion should be
interpreted to include only those instances in which "legal
sanction[s] ... or... a condition of some other right, benefit or
privilege, [directly] require[s] individuals" to participate in re-
ligious exercise.' 3 ' Using this definition, ambiguous social
pressure by members of society will not be defined as official
coercion since it is not directly attributable to the govern-
ment.32 This idea fully recognizes the fact that mature,
graduating seniors will be able to acknowledge the distinctions
between government action and indirect social pressure.133 Be-
maintain a respectful silence "can be as real as any overt compulsion." Id. He
also asserted that for someone of a young age such activity may be perceived
as coerced participation rather than simply as a showing of respect. See id.
129. Justice Scalia emphasized that standing at a public ceremony is sim-
ply a measure of respect: "surely our 'social conventions have not coarsened to
the point that anyone who does not stand on his chair and shout obscenities
can reasonably be deemed to have assented to everything said in his pres-
ence." Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. See, e.g., McPherson, supra note 114, at 419. Many scholars also be-
lieve that as long as students are not forced to participate in or to accept re-
ligious beliefs which they do not support, respectful accommodation while
others engage in such practices cannot constitute an Establishment Clause
violation. See id.; see also Paulsen, supra note 46, at 798-99. While Professor
Paulsen does not believe that social pressure should be attributed to the gov-
ernment, he believes that attendance at the graduation ceremony is compelled
and therefore that government has coerced participation in a religious exer-
cise even if students are not "forced to further participate in particular acts of
religious worship." Paulsen, supra note 46, at 798-99. In effect, Professor
Paulsen sees mere attendance as constituting a religious exercise, but rejects
the idea that standing and remaining silent constitutes participation. See id.
at 799, 841-42.
131. Paulsen, supra note 46, at 797.
132. See Paulsen, supra note 46, at 847 (stating that "private pressure to
conform does not constitute state action").
133. See, e.g., Kimberly T. Morgan, Note, Can Students Do What the State
Cannot Do?: The Constitutionality of Student Initiated, Sponsored, Composed
and Delivered Prayers at Graduation, 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 273,
290 (1996). Morgan states that graduation is traditionally seen as "a stu-
dent's passage into adulthood" at which time they become full members of so-
ciety with all its inherent responsibilities and privileges. Id. at 290-91. Re-
quiring students to become mature adults and take full responsibility for their
actions while simultaneously doubting their ability to resist peer pressure re-
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cause graduating high school students are expected to have
reached a point at which they can take full adult responsibility
for their lives, part of such responsibility should include the
ability to discern government action from the coercive pressure
of their classmates.134 By defining coercion to include indirect
social pressure, the Court insults our country's young people by
failing to credit them with the ability to make intelligent ob-
servations and distinctions.
The majority's holding in Lee-that a government benefit
was conditioned upon coerced participation in prayer by virtue
of the indirect social pressure to stand and remain silentl35-
defies the normal conception of government coercion.1 36 While
there may be some social pressure to remain silent, this pres-
sure cannot be attributed to the government. In no other area
of constitutional law has the government evidenced its willing-
ness to accept responsibility for the actions of the civic major-
ity. Instead, the government has always steadfastly main-
tained that it is not responsible for the conduct of private
citizens and has refused to take action against civilian indi-
garding religion seems illogical and contradictory. See id. at 290-91.
134. Some courts have also embraced this reasoning. In Jones v. Clear
Creek Independent School District, the court wrote, "We also consider the age
of the graduating seniors relevant to the determination of whether prayers ...
can coerce these young people into participating in a religious exercise." 977
F.2d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 1992). According to the Jones court, high school
graduates are mature enough to make a distinction between neutral and coer-
cive government action. See id.
135. According to McPherson, many courts that were faced with the issue
of school graduation prayer before Lee determined that no coercion was pres-
ent by virtue of the fact that attendance at graduation ceremonies is com-
pletely voluntary. Therefore, participation in religious exercises at such
ceremonies could not be considered compelled, because a student who did not
want to participate could either boycott the event or simply remain silent. See
McPherson, supra note 114, at 416. In Lee the majority foreclosed this rea-
soning, stating that it "lack[ed] all persuasion." 505 U.S. 577, 595 (1992). Ac-
cording to Justice Kennedy, a high school student has no real choice but to
attend a high school graduation ceremony because it is "one of life's most sig-
nificant occasions," and "absence would require forfeiture of those intangible
benefits which have motivated the student through youth and all her high
school years." Id. at 595.
136. Webster's defines "coerce" as "to restrain or dominate by force; to
compel to an act or choice; or to bring about by force or threat"; and uses
"force" as a synonym to the word, clearly emphasizing that indirect pressure
is not considered part of coercion. WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 222
(10th ed. 1993).
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viduals for instances of segregation, discrimination, or even
free speech restrictions. 137
The majority in Lee also expressed concern that coercion
implicitly existed at the graduation ceremonies because the
students had no effective way to express their disagreement
with the religious content of the ceremony, short of boycotting
or foregoing the event.138 However, it is unlikely that mere at-
tendance at a graduation ceremony and silence during a prayer
will be perceived as evidence of participation in the religious
exercise by other students or the audience. Rather, a mature
student will discern that these actions do not necessarily indi-
cate participation in or support of a religious exercise, but in-
stead constitute a simple showing of respect for the religious
beliefs of peers. 3 9 Furthermore, a student who wishes to pro-
test the prayer can remain seated during the prayer. Such ac-
tion, although silent, clearly announces the student's protest to
all those everyone in the graduating class and the audience. A
student who remains seated can in no way be considered to be
participating, much less, coerced, into observance of a religious
exercise.
In Black Horse, the school district went to great pains to
reinforce this impression by ensuring that everyone in the
audience knew that some of the graduating seniors did not
sanction or wish to participate in the prayer. Various disclaim-
ers printed on the graduation program disavowed the State's
support of the prayer, and explicitly indicated that not all stu-
137. In today's society for example, private discrimination is still permitted
by private schools, country clubs, etc., as are restrictions on speech that are
made by non-governmental actors.
138. 505 U.S. at 596-98.
139. McPherson notes that while religious expression may make some stu-
dents "uncomfortable... [s]chools... cannot ensure the comfort of every stu-
dent in every circumstance." McPherson, supra note 114, at 420 (citations
omitted). Seeking to make students "comfortable" also does not appear to be a
valid rationale for separationism-prohibiting expression might make relig-
ious students just as "uncomfortable" as their atheist counterparts would be if
such expression were allowed. See id. at 420-21. One must also question a
school system that "shelterts students] ... from any ideas that might conflict
with their previously-held beliefs." Id. at 421. The very concept of public edu-
cation is to expose students to various intellectual concepts that have been
previously unknown to them. By exposing students to new ideas, we chal-
lenge students and encourage the intellectual growth that makes them capa-
ble of responsible participation as adults in contemporary society. For this
reason, "it is important that students of all religious beliefs and those of no
religious beliefs, be given equal opportunity to express themselves." Id.
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dents supported the prayer.1 4° These protections should be suf-
ficient to allow a student in the Black Horse district to accom-
modate the religious exercise of the majority without having
his mere presence interpreted as coerced state participation in
a peripheral religious activity. The concerns of the majority in
Lee are unwarranted because there is no evidence suggesting
that attendance alone causes students to feel state compulsion
or coercion to participate, or even to be perceived by others as
participating.
If the Supreme Court defined coercion to include only di-
rect government pressure to participate in religious exercises,
it would use the term in a way that most closely fits its every-
day meaning. As members of society we are often subject to
peer pressure, which we all must learn to distinguish from offi-
cial government action. The government cannot and should
not be made responsible for the private actions of its citizens.
Lower courts should interpret the coercion element of this new
doctrine in accordance with Justice Scalia's definition of coer-
cion and resist the urge to include indirect or imagined peer
pressure to conform. According to this definition, the prayer at
issue in Black Horse will be constitutional because it is simply
a private expression of religious belief desired by the chosen
community, with participation uncontrolled and unrelated to
any government force or compulsion.
3. Accommodation of the Majority, not a Dictatorship by the
Minority, Best Fulfills the Normative Aspirations of Our
Democratic System
Some opponents of graduation prayer argue that allowing
student-initiated invocations at commencement allows a tyr-
anny of the majority to sacrifice the rights of the minority.
However, under the Lee analysis, a minority of students are
able to prevent religious observance by the majority, therefore
allowing a small group to control the fate of many. This type of
"minority dictatorship" is antithetical to our nation's basic ide-
als of democracy. Accommodation of majority beliefs, on the
other hand, embodies fundamental principles of our democratic
system.
In the instance of a majority vote, a few individuals are
asked to accommodate the religious views of the community.
140. See ACLU v. Black Horse Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1475 (3d
Cir. 1996).
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Those who disagree with the views of the general community
are free to express their dissatisfaction by remaining silent
and/or seated during the prayer. Their participation is not co-
erced by government power, nor even required by those around
them. Therefore, the program does not result in a tyranny of
the majority, but is simply a reflection of important community
values. As long as members of the minority are not forced to
adopt or embrace the preferences of the majority, they suffer no
intrusion on their civil rights. When the opposite result is al-
lowed to occur, however, a chosen few are able to stymie the
wishes of a great many. This outcome reflects not a democracy,
but rather a monarchy or dictatorship, forms of government
the Framers wished to prohibit under our Constitution. Our
nation is founded on a tradition that allows the majority view
to prevail as long as the minority is permitted to respectfully
dissent.
The Black Horse program carefully removed all aspects of
state control from the decision to include prayer in the gradua-
tion ceremony. Additionally, there was no direct government
pressure to participate in the prayer, nor even a requirement
that a student stand or remain silent. Students who did not
wish to participate in the prayer were free to do so, and their
attendance at the ceremony was neither explicitly nor implic-
itly conditioned on participation in the religious exercise.
Rather, the program simply sought to accommodate the obser-
vance of religious beliefs held by a large portion of the commu-
nity. Therefore, the Black Horse program fulfills the norma-
tive aspirations of the Framers and should have been declared
constitutional by the Third Circuit.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has provided little guidance for lower
courts in determining the outcome of Establishment Clause
challenges. Therefore, lower courts must carefully examine
Supreme Court precedent and follow changing interpretations
of the Court to ensure consistent results. Because the Su-
preme Court has expressly used a coercion test when deciding
issues of graduation prayer, circuit courts should only utilize
this test when deciding similar issues. Under this test, state
action passes constitutional muster if the state does not control
or coerce participation in a religious exercise.
The Black Horse court failed to follow the Supreme Court's
analysis and erroneously utilized the Lemon test when it ana-
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lyzed the Black Horse prayer policy. The court also erred in its
application of the coercion test when it attributed private social
pressure to the school board. Had the court applied the defini-
tion of coercion embraced by the dissent in Lee, it would have
correctly identified the conduct that the Framers sought to
prohibit under the Establishment Clause and declared the
Black Horse program constitutional.

